What made me care about IT security and why you should too

I’ve been asked many times why I care about IT security.  It started in earnest for me way back in 2000 when somebody invaded my house.  I first published this story in the February, 2001 edition of Enterprise Linux Magazine.


International Terrorism in Minnesota

I’ve written extensively in this column about a small Linux DNS server I run.  Imagine my surprise a few weeks ago when I found my system launching a denial of service attack against the Government of Brazil.  That set a chain of events in motion every bit as traumatic for me as the recent Presidential election was for everyone else.

It all started when I tried to access my email.  For some reason, the response time was unbelievably slow.  About that time, my wife complained she couldn’t get to the Martha Stewart Web site, or anywhere else on the Internet, and what did I do to the computers this time?

I started investigating and found my house LAN was indeed running very slow.  I looked at my hubs and found port 4 on one hub going nuts.  This was the port leading to my DNS server.  The ps –ax command showed me the following process:

ping -s 65000 -f nn.nn.nn.nn (I won’t share the target IP address.)

My DNS server was sending 65,000 byte packets as fast as it possibly could to a system across the Internet.  When I killed the process, performance went back to normal.

A feeling of dread came over me and my adrenaline started pumping.  Then I got mad as I realized some jerk broke into my DNS server and set up this attack.  Fortunately for the Internet, I don’t have enough bandwidth for anyone significant to seriously care about.  Unfortunately for me, this jerk found out where I am and how to break in to my network.  I felt violated, angry, and afraid all at the same time, especially when I thought about all the data I have squirreled away in various directories on computers all over my network.  I wanted to find this jerk and strangle him or her, but I didn’t have the tools to even know where to begin.

So I called my friends at Mission Critical Linux for help.  I explained the situation and we all agreed that somebody had compromised my system.  I learned a lot about network break-ins that day.  I learned that BIND 8.2.2-P5, the version of DNS bundled with Red Hat Linux 6.1, has “hundreds” of security vulnerabilities, and that Red Hat keeps a list of bug fixes and updates on its web site.  I should have periodically checked for these updates.

I learned to shut down services such as sendmail, telnet, and ftp because they serve no useful purpose on this machine.  Sendmail uses its own process while the inetd process controls ftp, telnet, and others.  These commands ensure they won’t start at boot time:

/sbin/chkconfig –level 345 sendmail off
/sbin/chkconfig –level 345 inet off.

That’s when I remembered that telnet had been behaving strangely.  When I tried to connect via telnet, it wouldn’t echo anything and lately would just tell me the process was ending.

The support person laughed and told me I’d been suckered by the oldest trick in the book.  Somebody probably replaced the real telnet with a fake version designed to steal passwords for later transmission to the bad guys.  The system had definitely been compromised.

The technical recommendation:  Wipe the hard drive and rebuild the system from scratch.  The next recommendation:  Call the FBI immediately because the IP address my system attacked belongs to the Brazilian National Government, and I could face legal trouble if I didn’t report it.

As soon as we hung up, I called the Minneapolis FBI office and asked for somebody who deals with computer crime.  The receptionist sent me to a lady.  The conversation went like this:

Greg:  “Hi – I need to report a computer crime.  Somebody broke into my DNS server and launched a denial of service attack against the government of Brazil.”

FBI Lady:  “Wait a minute.  Did you say D-E-S server?”

Greg:  “No, a DNS server.”

FBI Lady:  “Oh – D – N – S, OK.  What did they do to your computer?”

Greg:  “Somebody tried to use my computer to attack a computer that evidently belongs to the Brazilian Government.”

FBI Lady:  “OK, . . ., who did it?  Do you have their address?”

Greg:  “No.  See, a DNS server translates names to addresses on the Internet.  One of my computers is a DNS server and somebody out there on the Internet tried to use my computer to attack this other computer in Brazil.”

FBI Lady:  “OK, but we need to know who did it.  We need a name or address or some way to find this person.”

Greg:  “Well, I was kind of hoping you guys could help me figure that out.”

FBI Lady:  “There’s not much we can do if we don’t know who broke into your computer.  Don’t you have any idea how to find this person?”

Greg:  “I wish.  See, the Internet is a whole bunch of computers all around the world and they’re all connected to each other.  Somebody on one of those computers found my computer and made it do this attack.  Since all these computers are connected to the Internet, we don’t know if the attacker is next door or across the world someplace.  But maybe they left some clues inside my computer to help track them down.”

FBI Lady:  “OK, let me get your phone number and somebody will call you back.”

Greg:  (after giving my phone number)  “Any idea when I’ll hear from somebody?”

FBI Lady:  “No.  They’re all pretty busy, ya know.”

Greg:  “Thanks.”

I made that call on Tuesday, Nov. 11, 2000 at roughly 1 PM central time.  I called again at 4:30 PM the same day.  As of this writing on December 15, 2000, I still haven’t heard back from the FBI.  I don’t mean to complain, but I was hoping the FBI would be sharper than that.

I’ll share how I rebuilt my DNS server and a list of helpful books in a future column.


I realized later, I made a mistake on my dates in the article.  Nov. 11, 2000 was a Saturday.  I know I called the FBI on a Tuesday, so the correct date would have been either Nov. 7 or Nov. 14.  To this day, I have no idea how I came up with Nov. 11 for a date in the original article.  But this key detail gave me an insight into how the FBI works.

My phone rang one morning in Feb. 2001, a few days after the article ran.  It was a manager in the Minneapolis FBI office and he wanted to troubleshoot.  I thanked him for the call, but said I could not afford to shut down my life and wait three months for a callback from law enforcement.  I had long ago wiped and rebuilt that system.

That’s when he went into CYA mode.  He said that since I called on a Saturday (remember, I really called on a Tuesday) I must have connected to a weekend operator.  That was why they had no record that I had ever called.  Yeah.  Uh-huh.  My tax dollars at w0rk.

Lesson learned – law enforcement is of little or no value in data breach scenarios.  Over the next several years, I would learn that lesson a few more times.

Here is why everyone should care about incidents like this.  Somebody exploited a flaw in one of my public facing systems to invade my house and use me as a drone in their attack against a third party.  Although nobody physically tramped through my house, the net result was the same–I was violated.  And I was on my own to fix it.  How many times since have we heard variations on that story?

If you’re running a business and somebody violates your company IT systems, the odds are slim that anybody from law enforcement will help you.  If you’re an individual consumer, the odds are even slimmer.  So read books like “Bullseye Breach” to educate yourself on how these violations happen, read earlier posts in this blog, and keep an eye on future posts for ideas to reduce your attack surface.

If you bury your head in the sand, don’t be surprised when somebody kicks your exposed rear-end.

A few security FAQs

Here are a few FAQs (frequently asked questions) about Internet security.  I should have put this together a long time ago.

Q: I don’t keep national security secrets inside my computer or cell phone. Aren’t all these so-called security products the real scam?

A: You probably don’t have any secrets anyone cares about.  But the game is not to steal your secrets.  The real game is to make you an unwitting drone in a scheme to steal somebody else’s secrets.  You spent money for your computer equipment and you spend money every month for Internet and cell phone service.  If you don’t care about somebody using you for criminal projects, then don’t protect yourself.  You are either part of the solution or part of the problem.

Q: Why don’t all those lonely teenage hackers get a life?  And why are the most powerful companies in the world at the mercy of a few evil computer genius hackers?

A: These are the wrong questions to ask.  The image of a lonely teenage boy in his bedroom stealing national security secrets for fun might play well in Hollywood, but it’s not real. So are the images of an evil computer genius threatening to destroy the world by guessing the secret password and typing a few commands, and the good guy genius who saves the world in the nick of time. Most of the bad activity these days comes from organized criminal organizations or nation-states, not any single individual. Those powerful companies are vulnerable because the people charged with keeping them safe did not do their jobs.

Q: If there are no evil computer genius hackers, then why do we see almost daily reports of cyber breaches?

A: I didn’t say there are no evil geniuses, only that the Hollywood images are wrong. There are plenty of evil geniuses in the world, but they are only a small part of an entire global criminal industry.  Just like legitimate industry, the shadowy Internet criminal industry has venture capitalists, inventors, markets, tech support services, and specialists for every conceivable discipline.

Q: Why are we all such sitting ducks on the Internet and why doesn’t somebody do something about it?

A: Just like humans developed an overwhelming advantage over other animals on our planet by developing language, bad guys currently have an advantage over good guys because bad guys collaborate better than good guys.  Business and government can erase that advantage by bringing security practices out into the open and giving them more than lip service.  We can influence policy by educating ourselves and using our market power to support organizations with good security policies.

Q: Is it true that my Internet connected baby monitor can destroy the Internet?

A: No, not by itself.  But combined with millions of other poorly designed IoT (Internet of Things) products, it can wreak plenty of havoc.  When you buy Internet connected devices, such as baby monitors, DVRs, security cameras, door locks, thermostats, ovens, you name it, make sure they have a mechanism for updates in the field.  Make sure you don’t use factory default passwords and make sure they don’t have default passwords or other back doors permanently baked into the hardware.  And put them all behind a credible firewall.

Q: Speaking of firewalls, since all my stuff is behind a firewall, doesn’t that mean I’m safe?

A: No.  Firewalls are one part of a bigger picture.  They stop unsolicited traffic.  Firewalls are worthless when you invite the traffic in.  That’s why it’s important to be careful about what websites you visit and avoid opening email attachments.  And that’s why you need antivirus software, even if nobody has a perfect antivirus solution.

Q: Today’s high tech is boring and complicated.  Why can’t they just make this stuff simple and usable?

A: They is really us.  Spend more time with security, where technology and psychology meet and the results are fascinating.

Q: Where can I find an entertaining story about how major data breaches play out?

A: One great perk about my own blog: I get to plant great lead-in questions.  Here is a shameless plug for my first book, “Bullseye Breach,” an educational book about data breaches disguised as a thriller novel about how the Russian mob penetrates Minneapolis retailer, Bullseye Stores, and steals 40 million customer credit card numbers.  Here is a two minute silent video about how that attack unfolds.

And stay in touch for information about book #2 coming soon.  This time, a nation-state really does mount an attack.  And the stakes are much higher than credit card fraud.

Our political leaders set a sorry security example

I am constantly amazed by how much cyber-security effects our 21st century lives every day, and by how clueless our leaders on both sides of the political isle are about all of it.

Let’s start with Hillary and the Democrats.  I’ll dump on Trump and the Republicans in a minute.

First up is Hillary’s email server.  I’ve said over the years that I have no problem with Hillary running her own email server.  And, given what we’ve since learned about US Government security with stories like the OPM breach, I might have run my own email server if I were in her position.  One difference – I know more about running an email server than Hillary.

Whether or not what she did is criminal is still being argued, but we all learned she was, at minimum, wildly careless handling sensitive information.  A United States Secretary of State should know better.  Her reaction?  Double-down on ignorance.  Check out this piece from The Daily Beast here.  Another link to the embedded Youtube video here.  At around the 1:05 mark, the reporter asks Hillary about wiping her email server.  Her reply – “You mean, like with a cloth or something?”  Arrogant, ignorant, and proud of it.  A dangerous combination.  The FBI report came out this summer (2016).  I posted thoughts about FBI Director Comey’s announcement here.

Check out FBI Director Comey’s announcement, where he describes how an army of FBI professionals needed a year to painstakingly comb through that server hard drive to recover thousands of deleted messages.  Why were they deleted?  Only one explanation holds up: Hillary must have ordered her email administrator to uninstall Microsoft Exchange and delete the datastore, but nobody wiped the deallocated space.  A rookie mistake?  Or a bungled coverup?  How much would an enemy of the United States pay for a copy of the discarded hard drive from the Secretary of State’s email server?  So, yeah, wildly reckless is a charitable characterization.

Although there is no evidence Hillary’s email server was ever penetrated, apparently the Russians did penetrate the Democrats’ email server. And now the whole world sees a daily barrage of  embarrassing, private messages, courtesy Wikileaks.  And in the process, we’ve now legitimized Wikileaks, even though its leader is currently holed up in the Ecuadorian Embassy to block extradition for sexual assault.  Full disclosure here – I have personal experience with Wikileaks.  Here are details.

And that leads to Donald Trump, chief Wikileaks legitimizer.  The Donald, maybe our next President, who fires apprentices for making weenie excuses for failure.  So how did Trump Industries handle its data breach last year, when it exposed thousands of its own customers to credit card fraud?

Like virtually every other company these days, we have been alerted to potential suspicious credit card activity and are in the midst of a thorough investigation to determine whether it involves any of our properties,” the statement reads. “We are committed to safeguarding all guests’ personal information and will continue to do so vigilantly.”

I added the italics for emphasis because it was a weenie excuse.  Read the July, 2015 krebsonsecurity.com story here, and the Krebs followup October, 2015 story here.

It gets worse.  Krebs reported a second data breach in April 2016.  Article here.

That’s right.  Anyone who stayed in a Trump hotel through most of 2014, 2015, and early 2016 should consider calling their bank and requesting a new credit card.

And now, the ultimate in irony.  “We’re so obsolete in cyber,” Trump told The New York Times. “We’re the ones that sort of were very much involved with the creation, but we’re so obsolete.”

Donald said that in March, 2016.  Now it’s October, 2016 and we all recently learned how right Donald was.  Although not in the way he intended.

The news broke on Monday, Oct. 17 when security researcher, Kevin Beaumont, did some simple probes of publicly available data and found that the Trump organization uses Windows 2003 with Exchange 2003 as its email server.  Here is a ZDNet article with details.  Here is a Vice News article with more.

IT professionals’ jaws should be dropping right now.  For the uninitiated, as of October, 2016, Windows 2003 really is 13, count ’em, 13 years old.  Which means today’s 7th graders weren’t born yet when Windows 2003 first became available.  Microsoft no longer supports Windows 2003 and no longer issues security updates.  Which means the Trump public facing email server is the Internet equivalent of a large rob me sign taped to the front doors of all Trump properties.  Which may explain why criminals were able to so easily steal thousands of customer credit card numbers from Trump Industries, not once, but twice.

And it gets worse.  Trump’s response is nonsense.

“The Trump Organization deploys best in class firewall and anti-vulnerability technology with constant 24/7 monitoring. Our infrastructure is vast and leverages multiple platforms which are consistently monitored and upgraded using current cyber security best practices.”

Defending the choice to continue operating a hopelessly obsolete email server because it’s behind a firewall is like changing the car oil to compensate for bad tires.  The Trump response demonstrates an amazing lack of basic understanding about what firewalls do – and don’t do.

I wonder if Trump will still be a Wikileaks supporter when his private emails start showing up in newspaper headlines?

And finally, we learn that Republicans and Democrats do share some common ground in this divisive election year.  They’ve both been breached.  The Democrats lost emails and the Republicans lost credit card numbers.  Anyone who purchased anything from the Republicans between March 2016 and the first week of October should contact their bank and ask for a new credit card.  Details here.

If you’re a political candidate or an organization decision maker, listen up.  Based on what I’ve seen, you probably don’t know nearly as much as you think you know about cyber-security.  So accept my shameless book plug and consider buying a copy of “Bullseye Breach,” right here.  You’ll be entertained and you’ll learn how this stuff really works and what you can do to stop it.

I’m also looking for an agent and publishing partner for book #2, where a nation-state really does attack the United States.  More news on that as it gets closer to publication.

Hillary and respect for IT and her email server

By now, everyone knows about yesterday’s FBI announcement about the Hillary Clinton email server investigation. James Comey’s words, “extremely careless” were widely quoted. As expected, the Trump camp responded with much sound and fury, signifying nothing. And the Hillary camp responded by claiming vindication. Both camps are wrong. What a surprise.

I downloaded and read a copy of the transcript and listened to a recording of the whole announcement today. Read this paragraph from the Comey statement:

“I have so far used the singular term, ’email server,’ in describing the referral that began our investigation. It turns out to have been more complicated than that. Secretary Clinton used several different servers and administrators of those servers during her four years at the State Department, and used numerous mobile devices to view and send email on that personal domain. As new servers and equipment were employed, older servers were taken out of service, stored, and decommissioned in various ways. Piecing all of that back together — to gain as full an understanding as possible of the ways in which personal email was used for government work—has been a painstaking undertaking, requiring thousands of hours of effort.”

I said earlier that if I were in Hillary’s shoes back in 2009, I might have put in my own email server too. I haven’t heard anything to change my mind, especially given what we’ve learned recently about government data breaches.

The email server isn’t the issue. The real issue is respect. Why does somebody use several different servers and administrators over four years? As somebody who delivers server administration services, I can think of only one reason – she was either an unreasonably demanding customer or she hired amatuers willing to work cheap.

Good email administrators are professionals and the former Secretary of State should have respected the professionals she hired for this purpose – not switched them out like changing clothes. I would love to talk to a few of the people she brought in and then got rid of. Were they professionals that she treated badly or were they amatuers who didn’t know what they were doing? Either answer is bad for Hillary.

What about Trump? He continues to make a fool of himself and too many Americans are too willing to follow him off a cliff.

For the first time in my life, I’m faced with two awful choices for President. Maybe a 3rd alternative with a credible chance of winning will come along.

Sometimes it’s not a cyber-attack

It’s good to know that at least my family listens to my constant Internet safety lectures.  I wish more business leaders would do more than talk about taking security seriously.  I am under constant cyber-attack.  Every single day, more than 100 phishing emails hit my inbox.  Some are clever.  One cussed me out for sending a bogus invoice, conveniently attached to the message.  Another cussed me out for not paying an invoice, also attached.  Many claim to come from UPS or USPS or Amazon with news that the package I was expecting had a delivery problem.  Open the attachment for details.  My “Bullseye Breach” book website regularly comes under attack, most recently from a Russian IP Address.  Since “Bullseye Breach” is a book about how Russians steal forty million customer credit cards from a large retailer named Bullseye Stores, I guess the only surprise is that it took the Russians so long to attack it.

So when my daughter came to me with strange cell phone behavior, I knew it had to be another attack.

She was trading text messages with another mom to set up a play-date for my grandson.  The other mom offered to have my grandson over to her house to play with her son, and my daughter offered to stay and help.  Boys can be rambunctious when they get together.  This was one of my daughter’s messages, quoting with permission:

“Sounds good.  I am cool with staying and hanging out if you want.  I just don’t want you to feel like overwhelmed or anything.”

The other mom responded and they continued their text conversation.  I still don’t see the appeal of text messages as a primary form of communication.  Those teeny tiny keys and auto-correct drive me nuts.  If we’re both tapping little buttons on a phone, why not just talk to each other?  Maybe it’s a generational thing.

In the middle of her conversation with the other mom, two identical text messages from two different unknown local phone numbers came in.  The messages were, “who dis?” followed by forwards of my daughter’s messages to the other mom.

Shocked and afraid, my daughter asked me to help figure out how somebody invaded her phone.  Why was somebody stalking her from two different phone numbers and taunting her with her own text messages?  How did some lowlife intercept her text messages and play them back for her?  What did they want?

I was curious myself.

Looking over the conversations, the texters knew my daughter’s name and the date and time she planned to meet the other mom.  But we knew nothing about the texters.  Time to put on my tough guy dad hat.  I texted one of the numbers with “who are you and what do you want?” and was about to try to identify the other number and call the Police, when her phone rang from the first number. My daughter looked at me and handed me the phone.

“Hello,” I said in the strongest dad voice I could muster.  (It’s not the weapons you bring to the fight that count, it’s what the other guy thinks you bring to the fight that counts.)

To my surprise, the caller was a woman and she was just as mystified as my daughter.  She said she received a text message about staying and hanging out from this number, but had no idea what that meant or what was going on.  She knew my daughter’s name because my daughter used it in another message in the conversation thread.  The mystery was, how did this unrelated third party end up with a copy of part of my daughter’s half of a conversation with the other mom?

Curious, we called the other number.  That was also a woman, but she thought my daughter was a guy sending inappropriate advances.  What does “hang out” really mean anyway?  We had a long talk and cleared it up.

Apparently, my daughter’s cell carrier, T-Mobile, had a text message routing problem and sent copies of text messages to unintended phone numbers that night.  Imagine receiving a text message about hanging out and don’t feel overwhelmed with no other context from a strange phone number.  But this time, there was no cyber-attack, no stalkers, no perverts.  Just a T-Mobile tech glitch with suspicion layered on top.

Lessons?  Yup, a few.

  • It’s not always a cyber-attack or an evil cyber-stalker.  Sometimes it’s a tech glitch.
  • If you want to share intimate messages with somebody, best to do it by voice or face to face.  Text messages can be mis-routed.  I saw it first-hand.
  • And “who dis” must be a common text greeting.  I need to learn a new language.

We all need Apple to win the FBI encryption dispute

In December, 2015, two terrorists in San Bernardino, California, committed a horrific and gruesome crime when they murdered 14 coworkers and seriously injured 22 others.  Law enforcement caught up with these murderers a few hours later and they died in a shootout.  Good riddance.  If you commit an act of terrorism, you deserve the harshest consequences society can offer.

But this blog post isn’t about terrorism.  It’s about the aftermath these terrorists left behind in an encrypted Apple iPhone 5c.  Three months later, the FBI is unable to break into that phone to examine its contents.

The phone belongs to the San Bernardino County Department of Public Health, where one of the murderers was an employee, and is now in FBI custody.  The phone’s contents are encrypted and the phone may be set to brick itself after a small number of penetration attempts. Apple itself has no way to access it.  Here is a blog post with details.

The FBI wants Apple to engineer a special firmware update for this specific phone to allow the FBI to bypass the phone’s security and look at its contents.   The FBI secured a court order compelling Apple to cooperate.  Here is a PDF with the FBI motion.  Here is a PDF with the court order.  Apple CEO, Tim Cook, expressed Apple’s opposition to the order in an open letter, published on the Apple website.  Here is a PDF copy in case the website link goes bad.

And now the fight is on.  It’s the long awaited clash of privacy rights versus counter terrorism.  And although I question the value of anything stored inside the specific phone at the center of this fight, the big picture stakes could literally be life and death.

Naturally, politicians are weighing in.  In this article Donald Trump called Apple “disgraceful.”  Trump also said, “We should force them to do it. We should do whatever we have to do.”

And in a USA Today Opinion piece, Senator Richard Burr, R-NC, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, said, “The newest Apple operating systems allow device access only to users — even Apple itself can’t get in. Murderers, pedophiles, drug dealers and the others are already using this technology to cover their tracks.”  Here is a PDF of Senator Burr’s article in case the link goes stale.

On a personal level, if my family or friends were victimized by a terrorist attack, I would do everything in my power to gather information to bring the attackers to justice, and if encryption got in my way, I would bust whatever heads I needed to break it, legal or not.  I would not care about bigger policy issues.

But when I look dispassionately at the bigger picture, I am forced to conclude Apple is right and the FBI is wrong.  And the longer I look at the issue, the stronger my convictions become.

Tim Cook framed the Apple arguments around privacy and trust and a slippery slope to tyranny.  And his arguments are persuasive and right on.  But the arguments so far on both sides miss a larger point – the perceived trade-off pitting privacy against law enforcement is not the most important issue.  More important than any trade-off, weakening encryption, even to break into this one phone, hurts the fight against terrorism more than it helps and the government has no business trying to compel companies to break the security of their products.

Apple could break into this one phone and maybe the government might uncover a few names.  Maybe.  But at what long term cost?  Senator Burr, if Apple loses this fight, then murderers, pedophiles, drug dealers, and others will simply find another encryption tactic to cover their tracks.  If the government wins this skirmish with Apple, we will all pay a long term price in the more important war against crime and terrorism.

In a Feb. 19, 2016 interview on CBS This Morning, Assistant New York City Police Commissioner, John Miller, took Apple to task by asking Apple how many victims in Paris and San Bernardino were Apple customers.  Miller is right to frame the debate in life and death terms.  So my question for Miller, if I ever get a chance to ask is, how many more people will die if law enforcement forces tech companies to weaken encryption?  How does it make sense to cripple the good guys when the bad guys won’t follow the rules?

Like it or not,  strong encryption is here to stay.  It’s a fundamental part of 21st century society.  We can no more roll back encryption than we can replace cars with horses and buggies.

Don’t believe me.  Just use recent history as a guide.

For many years, the open source IPSEC community refused to accept contributions from US citizens because of the threat of US Government regulation.  So encryption technology continued to progress, just without input by the United States.   If we return to that broken way of thinking, we will blind the United States when dealing with our enemies.  Not only will we not be able to decipher encrypted communications, we may not even know they’re going on.

I spent 16 months writing and publishing “Bullseye Breach,” an educational book disguised as an international fiction story about how Russian criminals steal 40 million credit card numbers from a large US retailer named Bullseye Stores.   No amount of government regulation inhibiting or regulating encryption would have helped in any real-world breach scenarios, and the arguments suggesting the government act as a safe storage location for encryption keys has more holes than Swiss Cheese.  Just ask any victim of the recent OPM breach about the safety of US Government servers.  If people who apply for security clearances can’t trust the United States Government with private information, why should the general public trust the Government with millions, perhaps billions of encryption keys?

That’s why Apple must win this fight. To stop a first step down a slippery slope and keep the playing field level between the good guys and bad guys, so the good guys have a chance to fight back.  Crippling encryption cripples the good guys.  It delivers exactly the opposite result the government and all of us want.

One final note:  I am now a Red Hat employee.  For people unfamiliar with the tech industry, Red Hat is the preeminent open source software company and is rocking the IT industry.  The opinion expressed here is mine, and may not reflect what the leaders at Red Hat think.  But I’m right.